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1.  Introduction 
 
The clothing/apparel industry is held to be one of the most globalised industries 
of developed economies (Dicken 2003). This view is derived from the fact that 
most  writing  to  date  has  focused  mainly  on  the  geography  of  production, 
particularly  the  organisation  of  the  clothing  supply  chain  and  the  rise  to 
prominence of a steadily increasing number of lower-wage suppliers.  
 
The  geography  of  trade,  in  contrast,  has  attracted  much  less  attention.  The 
geography  of  trade  must  distinguish  particularly  between  domestic  sales  to 
indigenous retailers and exports to other countries. Where the relationship with 
domestic retailers has been covered in recent accounts of clothing firms, as in 
Gereffi’s (1994) work on buyer-driven supply chains, the emphasis has not been 
balanced  against  cross-national  relationships,  developed  as  exporters. 
Furthermore, the focus in this literature has been mainly on the US industry 
(Abernathy  et  al  1999;  Gereffi  1994).  Among  European  clothing  industries, 
only  the  Italian  industry  has  attracted  significant  attention,  and studies  (e.g. 
Berger  and  Locke  2001)  have  dealt  mainly  with  the  highly  distinctive 
production  organisation  found  in  industrial  districts,  rather  than  placing 
manufacturers in a worldwide and local web of dependencies with suppliers and 
retailers.  
 
This paper will focus on the way clothing firms in developed countries respond 
to the pressures of globalisation, by focusing both on their market strategy and 
their  supply  chain  organisation.  We  will  thus  cover  the  whole  network  of 
relationships  they  have  developed  and  demonstrate  the  interdependencies 
between different parts of their strategic response. We will show that trading 
relationships with both customers and suppliers (of both fabrics and finished 
garments) have strongly defined the British and German industries and their 
firms. Hence this study will make clear that, in many cases, a globalised supply 
chain may go hand in hand with a totally domestically focused sales strategy, 
which  also  constrains  responses  to  globalisation  of  many  other  aspects  of 
corporate organisation.  
 
By considering the cases of the British and German clothing industries and their 
networks  of  domestic  and  international  relationships,  this  paper  widens  the 
perspective beyond the US case. It is able to show that, despite the experience 
of some common pressures and responses, the US pattern is simply one variant 
that  has  been  over-generalised.  It  will  be  demonstrated  that  the  social 
institutional  framework  of  both  the  industry  and  the  wider  economy  has 
strongly shaped the development and current state of specific national clothing 
industries.   
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Section  2  outlines  the  theoretical  framework  adopted.  It  provides  a  brief 
analysis  of  the  structural  characteristics  of  the  clothing  industry.  After  an 
analysis of the value chain, some ideal-typical forms of clothing enterprise are 
constructed. These refer to different combinations of the steps in the value chain 
and the weight each of the three main industry protagonists – co-ordinating (or 
hub) firms, suppliers and retailers – possesses in each type. Developing some of 
the insights in the work of Gereffi (1994), a brief analysis is then made of the 
contest for control between the three main industry protagonists and how this 
has been shifting in recent times.  
 
Section  3  describes  and  analyses  the  German  and  UK  national  clothing 
industries. Section 3.1 places the development of the two industries in their 
global  context.  It  points  to  the  dual  interconnectedness  between  these  two 
western  European  industries  and  the  industries  in  newly  industrialising 
countries around the world. The fortunes of the British and German firms in the 
clothing industry are inextricably entwined with those in developing countries, 
both as their suppliers and, increasingly, as their competitors. An examination 
of  the  shifting  geography  of  production  since  the  early  1970s  will  clearly 
demonstrate the tremendous challenges firms in the two western countries are 
facing.  
 
In section 3.2, we show the impact this dual global exposure has had on the two 
national industries, in terms of the decline in the number of firms and their 
contribution  to  GDP  and  employment.  Next,  we  present  a  portrait  of  each 
national clothing industry (section 3.3) and of each retail sector (section 3.4), 
and identify important contrasts between them. Differences are summarised by 
reference  to  the  ideal-typical  structural  types  developed  in  section  2.  These 
portraits  demonstrate  the  exposure  of  each  national  industry  to  global 
competition  and  the  pressures  from  retailers  that  co-ordinating  firms  are 
experiencing.  We  additionally  indicate  how  most  clothing  firms  are 
simultaneously  very  domestically  and  globally  focused,  which  endows them 
with an incongruous mixed character.  
 
Section 4 then moves on to examine the strategies firms in the two countries 
have  adopted  to  deal  with  the  dual  pressures  from  global  competitors  and 
domestic retail customers. Particular attention is given to the organisation of the 
supply chain in British and German firms and to an analysis of the networks of 
external  relationships  that  have  arisen  from  different  types  of  organisation. 
Section 4.2 examines more recent strategic initiatives adopted by beleaguered 
hub firms to gain better control over their markets. Relations with customers 
therefore  are  given  equal  weight  to  relations  with  suppliers,  and  firms  are 
viewed as a network of all their internal and external relationships. The latter  
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will be analysed according to  the degree  of internationalisation/globalisation 
they possess.  
 
The  Conclusion  summarises  the  implications  of  different  national  firm 
strategies for competitiveness and draws out the theoretical insights developed.  
 
The data are taken from various statistical sources, as well as drawing on early 
impressions from interviews conducted in firms in both economies during 2003.  
 
 
2.  Theoretical Considerations 
 
2.1  Structural Characteristics of the Clothing Industry 
 
The  value  chain  in  the  clothing  industry  embraces  several  different  sets  of 
activity, roles and occupations, the characteristics of which shape the profile of 
the sector. (The following adapts and develops ideas from Dunford 2001:1-2.) 
A stylised analysis of the value chain identifies the following steps (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Steps in the Clothing Value Chain 
 
The first step in the chain, development and planning of the entire collection, 
involves  a  number  of  skilled  activities.  These  include  knowledge  of  market 
trends and of fabric availability, the integration of both into development of 
product lines, and the costing of the planned collection.  
 
The second step is the design and prototyping of new models. In addition to 
understanding  market  demand,  this  requires  both  creativity  and  technical 
aptitude to devise parts of a garment which, when joined together, provide both 
a  good  fit  and  a  stylish  appearance.  Again  considerations  of  cost  enter 
deliberations.  
 
In the third step, a production design and sample-making function then concerns 
itself with devising the most cost-efficient means of producing the item, bearing 
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place are also brought into consideration. Steps one to three thus rely on highly 
skilled occupations, involving technical, creative and financial capabilities.  
 
The  fourth  major  step  is  the  actual  manufacture  and  assembly  of  garments, 
which  is  generally  known  as  CMT  (cut-make-trim).  This  involves  mainly 
semi-skilled  sewing  and  assembly  operations,  using  simple  machines  and 
requiring elementary skills.  
 
The fifth step, the marketing of garments, seeks to match retail outlets to the 
quality and character of the clothes, and to achieve the broadest possible market 
access  in  a  given  segment.  In  practice  the  marketing  function  operates  in 
parallel with earlier steps since most clothing firms try to spread their risk by 
seeking  expressions  of  interest  from  retailers  before  moving  into  full 
production. 
 
The  sixth  step,  distribution,  entails  an  increasingly  sophisticated  logistics 
operation based on computerised order tracking and inventory control systems, 
driven by the shortening of fashion cycles and the importance of timeliness.   
 
The seventh and final step is that of selling the garments to consumers through 
various retail channels.  
 
These seven steps involving, on the one side, different kinds of knowledge, skill 
sets and occupations, and on the other, clearly identified costs, can, in principle, 
be separated from each other and performed in different locations. This process 
of fragmentation of the value chain and its distribution over different locations 
and  functions  can  occur  in  a  number  of  different  ways.  The  way  selected 
depends  on  available  knowledge  and  skill  sets,  cost  considerations  and  the 
nature of the final product and its market segment.   
 
At  least  five  different  ways  of  organising  the  clothing  value  chain  may  be 
identified. This makes for five different types of clothing enterprise, each with 
its distinctive power relationships. The latter have not only varied over time, 
according  to  shifting  cost  structures  and  market  demands,  but  also  between 
producers in different countries who are able to draw on different knowledge, 
skill sets and occupations.  
 
Five Business Models for Clothing Firms, Based on Different Combinations of Steps 
in the Value Chain 
 
1.  A  common  type  in  developed  countries  combines  steps  one  to  three 
(development  of  collection;  design  and  prototyping  of  new  models;  
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production design and sample making) with steps five and six (marketing 
and  distribution).  This  type  of  enterprise  employs  mainly  higher-level 
creative and technical designers and marketing staff. It has developed its 
own  brands  of  high-quality  clothing,  which  it  usually  seeks  to  sell  as 
coordinated collections that often include accessories.  
 
2.  Where garments are mainly produced for large retail chains, often under 
the retailers’ own labels, design and styling (Steps 1 and 2) receive less 
emphasis  because  items  are  developed  semi-collaboratively  with  the 
retailers.  The  marketing  effort  (Step  5),  on  the  other  hand,  is  geared 
towards one or a limited number of retail clients. The degree of expertise 
and the number of higher-level staff required, as well as the accompanying 
salary bill, therefore are considerably lower than in Type 1. Clothes are 
more standardised and produced in large volumes, in factories that may or 
may  not  belong  to  the  clothing  firm,  and  that  are  increasingly  located 
outside the home country.   
 
3.  Type 3, most common in both developing countries and in the informal 
sector of developed ones, is the enterprise solely carrying out step four 
(CMT  operations),  according  to  precise  specifications  and  using  fabrics 
specified by the co-ordinating firm. Such firms employ mainly semi-skilled 
operators, plus at least one technically skilled supervisor, and they range 
from  quite  small  to  huge  operations.  Some  producers  also  take 
responsibility for buying suitable fabric and trims, in which case they are 
known as ‘full package’ suppliers.
1 
 
4.  Two recently emerging types are those that have vertically integrated Step 
7 and thus conduct sales through their own distribution network of retail 
outlets,  sometimes  in  addition  to  sales  through  other  retailers.  Such 
enterprises require a larger staff and have to mix higher-level functions and 
knowledge of manufacturing with knowledge of retail and lower-level sales 
functions. The fully vertically integrated type, where firms have their own 
manufacturing, is fairly uncommon in developed countries, whereas the 
partially integrated type, without in-house manufacturing, has been gaining 
ground. This business model results in a very complex enterprise, requiring 
the  combination  of  disparate  knowledge  and  greater  managerial 
coordinating capacity. 
 
5.  The  last  type,  backward  integration  by  large  retailers  into  design  and 
coordination of the supply chain, is becoming increasingly common. In this 
case the retailer cuts out – partially or entirely – the Type 2 clothing firm 
which  is  effectively  acting  merely  as  a  middle  man.  Where  the  design  
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function is not developed, the retailer is  merely a buyer or importer of 
clothes,  and  higher-level  functions  are  executed  in  firms  in  newly 
industrialising countries.  
 
2.2  Power Relations between Actors in the Value Chain 
 
This section focuses on shifts in control, both over the organisation of the value 
chain and over the gains and losses from it, that accrue to the three main parties 
involved – the co-ordinating or hub firm, its supplier(s) and the retailer. Patterns 
identified  differ,  depending  on  the  size,  production  paradigm  and  market 
strategy of firms, as well as on the structure of the retail sector. We concur with 
Gereffi (1994) that retailers are important actors in the network of relationships, 
and  current developments  tend towards augmenting  their power. Because of 
concentration in the retail sector, coupled with increasing downward pressure 
on prices through intensified competition, retailers use their purchasing power 
to dictate terms to hub firms and thus are able to appropriate a disproportionate 
share of the value created. This then forces co-ordinating firms to pass on cost 
pressures to their suppliers who, because of the availability of many alternative 
manufacturers  with  largely  interchangeable  skill  sets,  become  price  takers. 
Moreover,  these  suppliers  are  vulnerable  to  their  customers’  migration  to 
lower-wage countries.   
 
This characterisation of a buyer-driven supply chain, although in many ways an 
accurate depiction of the current situation and development trends, nevertheless 
needs some modification. This type of relationship is above all found in the US 
and the UK, and should not be viewed as a general type. We instead suggest 
that  the  distribution  of  power  is  shaped  by  contextual  social  institutional 
constellations, which differ between countries. Based on managerial capacity 
and skill sets available, co-ordinating firms can shape the triangle of control by 
developing and enhancing their own power resources. Two such resources are 
particularly important. The first comes from the development of a high-quality, 
high-fashion branded product, the individuality of which makes it possible to 
cultivate a large and highly diversified retailer base that extends beyond the 
domestic market. The second, partly dependent on the first, entails acquiring 
greater control over the value chain through verticalisation. A hub firm that can 
thus counterpose its own power resources to those of retailers then also stands 
in a different relationship to the supplier. Although cost remains an important 
consideration in this relationship, it is more often balanced against requirements 





3. The National Industries in their Changing Global and Domestic Contexts 
 
3.1  The global context 
 
The clothing industry of developed economies was among the first to take on a 
global dimension, and today it is geographically highly dispersed around the 
globe, situated in both developed and developing countries. As the industry has 
not been amenable to technological rationalisation, its low capital and relatively 
high labour intensity
2 have made it an obvious candidate for development in 
newly industrialising countries on nearly all continents, thus fostering potential 
competitors to firms in developed countries. Due to the huge discrepancies in 
wage levels between developing and developed countries, firms in the latter 
have  had  to  rethink  their  organisation  of  the  value  chain.  High  wage  costs, 
together with the ease with which the value chain in this industry fragments, 
have thus resulted in the steadily increasing (and now almost total) outsourcing 
of production operations to lower-wage developing countries. Figure 2 shows 
these  differing  hourly  wage  rates,  which  are  well  known  throughout  the 
industry. 
 















Source:  Volksbanken / Raffeisenbanken 2003 
 
Large-scale  outsourcing,  in  turn,  obviously  has  resulted  in  drastic  cuts  in 
employment  in  developed  countries,  particularly  of  semi-skilled  jobs  like 
sewing,  which is  mostly  done by  women  and  frequently  by  ethnic  minority 
workers.  At  the  same  time  the  textiles  and  clothing  industries  still  remain 
significant employers, even though the average size of firms within them has 
declined. Governments and firms are not prepared just to withdraw from these 
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All these developments, as Dicken (2003:317) puts it, have made the industry a 
‘political football’ in the arena of international trade. To stave off the total loss 
of viability of these two industries in developed economies, governments have 
for several decades violated the principle of free trade between nations via the 
so-called  Multifibre  Arrangement  (MFA).  This  limits  trade  in  textiles  and 
clothing between developing and developed countries, through the imposition of 
quotas. The MFA, when it was introduced thirty years ago, was intended as an 
interim measure to allow firms in developed economies to adjust to competition 
from lower-wage countries. But the agreement has been renewed repeatedly and 
is scheduled for phasing out only at the beginning of 2005. In addition to quota 
impositions  on  imports  into  developed  countries,  there  also  exist 
disproportionately high customs duties.  
 
The MFA covers most world trade in clothing and textiles. It grew out of the 
Long Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles, which was concluded between 17 
industrial and 13 developing countries in 1962, mainly on the instigation of the 
US.  In  1973,  when  the  latter  was  transformed  into  the  MFA,  it  included 
continental European countries as well. The MFA was meant to introduce an 
orderly reorganisation of world trade, benefiting both developing and developed 
countries, by allowing an annual increase in trade of 6 per cent. Within the 
MFA,  separate  quotas  for  each  type  of  clothing  were  negotiated,  which 
regulated the export of textiles and clothing of individual developing countries 
for  import  into  individual  developed  countries.  The  MFA,  through  periodic 
re-negotiation,  became  more  rather  than  less  restrictive  over  time,  with  a 
multitude of bilaterally negotiated agreements supplementing its rules.   
 
After the Uruguay round of trade negotiations in the early 1990s, the MFA – 
renamed the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) – was to be phased out 
in four stages over a ten-year period (1995-2005). A given percentage of quota 
lines  were  to  be  incorporated  into the  GATT  at  each  stage.  Thus,  although 
sizeable proportions were incorporated in the late 1990s and early years of the 
21
st century, 49 per cent of quota lines have been left until the end of 2004. 
Moreover,  these  mainly  cover  the  most  sensitive  items  of  clothing,  where 
developing countries have a particularly high comparative advantage and where 
restrictions currently are high. Whether the restrictions will finally disappear or 
are  replaced  by  new  bi-lateral  agreements  remains  to  be  seen.  The  recent 
decision by Bush, worried about re-election, to give in to US manufacturers’ 
pressures  to  raise  import  barriers  in  violation  of  the  ATC,  illustrates  the 
difficulties ahead.  
 
There is no doubt that the MFA/ATC has significantly shaped global trade in 
textiles  and  clothing.  It  has  been  responsible  for  keeping  competition  from  
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low-wage countries within bounds and for upholding the current division of 
labour between developed and developing countries. But the MFA/ATC has had 
advantages for particular lowly developed countries, which gained a predictable 
market share quite independent of their actual competitiveness, while penalising 
developing  countries  that  already  exported  garments  before  the  MFA  was 
introduced. Trade patterns are also distorted, especially towards the end of each 
year, by shortages of available quota on certain types of clothing from certain 
countries. The EU is not as restrictive as the US. It is notable that around 70 per 
cent of total EU imports (in value) now are without any quantitative restrictions, 
and in 1999, almost 50 per cent of imports were exempted from customs duties 
(Stengg 2001: 21).  
 
It is clear from available statistics and from our interviews that in the last four 
years  or  so  the  position  of  textile  and  clothing  firms  in  both  Britain  and 
Germany has significantly worsened. The third stage of ATC implementation 
affected more sensitive categories than the previous two (Stengg 2001: 21), and 
additionally the lowering of tariffs from the mid-1990s may have played a part. 
But it is very difficult to get any reliable indication of what will happen after 
2005, once the bulk of really crucial quotas are set to disappear. This is partly 
because  the  MFA/ATC  has  always  elicited  efforts  to  circumvent  it  (quota 
hopping). This seems to have been convenient both for producers in developing 
countries and for co-ordinating firms in developed countries who sought access 
to specific suppliers of specific products. But the uncertainty also seems to be 
due to the fact that individual western firms simply cannot envisage how this 
very complex system of quotas, combined with an equally complex array of 
preferential customs arrangements, will affect their particular enterprise, due to 
their dual exposure to globalisation. Their business is reliant on suppliers in 
developing  countries,  but  it  could  be  negatively  affected  by  retailers  who 
circumvent  western  co-ordinating  firms  to  access  and  import  directly  from 
producers in the newly industrialising countries. The end of the ATC will bring 
about a significant reshuffling of suppliers in developing countries, where the 
more competitive ones, like China, seem set to make large gains. This, in turn, 
will react back onto the developed countries.  
 
Last, it is notable that developing countries maintain high tariff and non-tariff 
barriers themselves, as well as giving domestic firms more state support (Wrona 
1999:  159).  The  ending  of  the  ATC  envisages  that  these  barriers  will  be 
dismantled which, in turn, will open up some new export markets.  
 
To show the effects of both the rise of competitive clothing manufacturers in 
newly industrialising countries and the impact of the MFA/ATC, it is useful to  
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consider how the international ranking order of national clothing industries, in 
terms of exports, has changed over time. This is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  The World’s Leading Exporters and Importers of Clothing 
 
a)  Exports         
  2000  1980  1990  2000 
Exporting Country  US$ billion  %  %  % 
China  36.07  4.00  9.00  18.10 
Hong Kong, China  24.22  -  -  - 
  Domestic exports  9.94  11.50  8.60  5.00 
  Re-exports  14.28  -  -  - 
Italy  13.22  11.30  11.00  6.60 
Mexico  8.70  0.00  0.50  4.40 
United States  8.67  3.10  2.40  4.30 
Germany  6.84  7.10  7.30  3.40 
Turkey  6.53  0.30  3.10  3.30 
France  5.43  5.70  4.30  2.70 
India  5.15  1.50  2.30  2.80 
South Korea  5.03  7.30  7.30  2.50 
Indonesia  4.73  0.20  1.50  2.40 
United Kingdom  4.11  4.60  2.80  2.10 
Thailand  3.95  0.70  2.60  2.00 
Belgium  3.94  -  -  2.00 
Taiwan  2.97  6.00  3.70  1.50 
         
Above 15  125.40  65.60  68.20  63.10 
           
b)  Imports           
  2000  1980  1990  2000  Exports minus imports 
Importing Country  US$ billion  %  %  %  US$ billion 
United States  66.39  16.40  24.10  31.60  -57.74 
Japan  19.71  3.60  7.80  9.40   
Germany  19.31  19.70  18.20  9.20  -12.47 
Hong Kong, China  16.01  -  -  -   
  Retained imports  1.73  0.90  0.70  0.80   
United Kingdom  12.99  6.80  6.20  6.20  -8.88 
France  11.48  6.20  7.50  5.50  -6.05 
Italy  6.07  1.90  2.30  2.90  +7.15 
Netherlands  4.83  6.80  4.30  2.30  -0.87 
Belgium  4.81  -  -  2.30  +5.29 
Spain  3.77  0.40  1.50  1.80   
Canada  3.69  1.70  2.10  1.80   
Mexico  3.41  0.30  0.50  1.60   
Switzerland  3.22  3.40  3.10  1.50   
Russian Federation  2.96  -  -  1.40   
Austria  2.47  2.20  2.10  1.20   
           
Above 15  166.83  74.50  83.30  79.40  +27.63 
 
Source:  WTO (2001) International Trade Statistics, 2001, Table IV-80.  
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These figures, which include both garment parts sent to suppliers for making up 
and genuine exports of finished clothing, show very clearly that, despite the 
MFA/ATC, the position of newly industrialising countries has strengthened at 
the  expense  of  their  counterparts  in  developed  countries.  They  additionally 
demonstrate  some  reconfiguration  of  the  ranking  order  among  developing 
countries since the marketisation of China and its inexorable rise to industrial 
importance in a number of industries – among which the clothing industry is 
probably one of the strongest. Since it joined the WTO, China has enjoyed more 
liberal access to the markets of developed countries, and it is widely posited that 
the  expansion  of  its  share  of  world  trade  will  strongly  increase  during  the 
coming years. Among industrial countries, the US, Italy, Spain and Japan have 
lost little export share in clothing. It is, however, unclear what proportion are 
‘exports’ of clothing parts to supplier countries and what proportion are genuine 
exports of finished clothing. The US, for example, is said to be not as strong on 
genuine exports as in gross value creation (Groemling and Matthes 2003: 13). 
The UK, France and Germany all have suffered a severe decline in their share of 
world exports, albeit from different starting positions. 
 
How this changed ranking order plays itself out in the two countries covered in 
this paper is the topic of the following sections, which offer a detailed analysis 
of  both  clothing  industries,  including  the  relationship  with  retailers  and 
suppliers of fabrics.   
 
3.2  The Development of the German and UK Clothing Industries  
 
A factory-based clothing industry, in both countries, developed in the second 
half  of  the  19
th  century.  The  UK  and  German  clothing  industries  remained 
important industries, both in terms of employment and in their contribution to 
GNP, throughout most of the post-war decades. The industry’s share of overall 
manufacturing output remained higher in the UK than in Germany (Owen 2003: 
2, chart 1.2). The competitive pressures from newly industrialising countries 
began to be felt from the 1970s onwards. As competition was muted by global 
agreements, decline in both national industries at first was gradual, to become 
precipitous only in the 1990s. Its impact has been magnified by the fact that 
clothing production in both countries has a high concentration in a few regions 
(BBI 2001/02: 17; KFAT 2000).  
 
Because of Germany's more highly developed collective bargaining system and 
ensuing higher wage rates, reorganisation of the value chain and relocation of 
the manufacturing function to lower-wage countries started much earlier than in 
the UK. Already by the 1970s, around 70 per cent of German clothing firms 
were involved in some offshore production, utilising both foreign sourcing and  
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varying  degrees  of  equity  participation  in  roughly  equal  measures  (Froebel, 
Heinrichs and Kreye 1980). In Britain, foreign sourcing on a grand scale did not 
start  until  the  1990s.  This  was  partly  due  to  the  lower  wage  rates  and  the 
wide-spread utilisation of an informal sector that, in its conditions and rates of 
pay,  did  not  differ  appreciably  from  those  in  some  low-wage  countries.  A 
second and equally important reason for the delay in the reorganisation of the 
value chain by UK manufacturers was the strong control over most of the big 
firms  exerted by  the largest  multiple  clothing retailer, Marks  &  Spencer.  In 
1985 Marks & Spencer bought one-fifth of all UK-produced clothing (Bevan, 
2001),  and  it  enforced  a  ‘buy  British’  policy  right  into  the  1990s.  Hence 
employment decline, though not necessarily a decline in output, started much 
earlier in Germany than in the UK.  
 
More recently, decline has accelerated in both countries, evident not only in 
shrinking manufacturing employment, but also in the number of firms and in 
output and turnover. The following figures, although not strictly comparable, 
nevertheless illustrate this process.  
 
In  Britain,  a  first  period  of  marked  decline  in  employment,  but  not  output, 
occurred  between  1978  and  1988.  It  then  resumed  from  1995  onwards  and 
strongly accelerated after 1998 (Warren 2003: 231). Between 1995 and 2000, 
employment  declined  from  216,000  to  127,000,  a  decline  of  58.8  per  cent. 
(ONS Labour Market Trends 2002: British Apparel and Textile Confederation 
estimates).  By  2001,  a  further  ten  thousand  jobs  had  gone.  This  time 
employment decline was accompanied by decline in output. As this decline was 
strongly regionally based – in the East Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside, 
Scotland,  and  the  North  West  –  the  negative  impact  on  employment  was 
magnified (UK Garment Workers Report 2000). In terms of companies, some 
1,600 firms (-19.2%) disappeared in 1996-2000 (Euratex, 2002), and there is no 
reason to expect the pace to have slowed since then, despite the break-up of 
Coats  Viyella  and  the  fragmentation  of  Courtauld.  The  decline  in  value  of 
production, from £8.0 billion to £4.8 billion between 1996 and 2002, was, at 40 
per  cent,  even  more  precipitous  although  the  time  period  is  not  exactly 
comparable (BATC estimates, based on ONS data). 
 
In Germany, the decline in employment, number of firms and output started 
much earlier, but the strongest overall decline also occurred in the 1990s. (The 
figures on  employment  decline during  the  1990s  also  are  influenced  by  the 
collapse  of the  textiles  and clothing  industry  in  eastern  Germany,  following 
unification.) The shrinkage in the number of firms (including mergers) from 
1990 to 2000, including micro firms with fewer than 20 employees, was from 
4,844  to  1,606  (Groemling  and  Matthes  2003:  figure  7,  p.7).  Decline  in  
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employment in the same period was 65 per cent (G&M 2003: 65). Between 
1995 and 2002, there occurred a 49.1 per cent decline in employment among the 
firms employing more than 20 people, but the decline in turnover was much 
lower at only 19 per cent (Manufacturing in Germany data, supplied by IHK 
Bielefeld). 
 
3.3  The Current Structure of the Clothing Industries 
 
This section makes comparisons along the following dimensions:  
 
1.  Composition in terms of firm size, employment and turnover, as well as 
ownership structure.  
2.  Managerial capabilities and skill structure.  
3.  Production and market strategy.  
 
3.3.1  Composition in terms of Firm Size, Employment, Turnover and Ownership 
 
In Germany, this industrial sector is structured on the Mittelstand pattern. As 
shown in Table 2, there are many very small and a few very large firms in the 
German clothing industry, but the bulk of employment and turnover now is 
generated by medium-sized firms with between 100 and 999 employees. The 
100 largest firms, which are internationally competitive and each achieve more 
than  Euro  25  million  in  annual  turnover,  generate  nearly  two  thirds  of  the 
sector’s annual turnover (VR 2003: 2). 
 
Table 2.  Structure  of  the  German  clothing  industry,  classified  by  number  of  employees,  
in 2000 
 
Per cent  Firms  Employees  Turnover 
1-19  66.4  8.4  4.8 
20-99  23.0  25.2  20.6 
100-999  10.3  57.3  61.5 
>1000  0.1  2.5  2.5 
 
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt 2000, cited by Groemling and Matthes 2003:62. 
 
Euratex  (2002)  also  notes  the  above-average  concentration  of  turnover  in 
German medium and large firms compared with the rest of Europe. Its analysis, 
which  is  based  on  different  definitions  of  firm  size,  suggests  that  85%  of 
turnover is generated by such firms. 
 
Table 3 provides some figures facilitating a comparison of the structure of the 
two national industries. In 2002, in the German industry, 560 firms with 20 or  
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more employees achieved a turnover of Euros 9.7 billion and employed 53,901 
people (VR2003: 1). If micro firms are included, the overall number of firms 
rises to 6,159 and turnover to 14.4 billion (VR 2003: 1, figures for 2001).  
 
Until the late 1990s the clothing industry in Britain had a polarized structure, 
characterised by a very small number of giant manufacturers and a very large 
number  of  relatively  small  firms.  The  equivalent  of  the  medium-sized 
Mittelstand firms was absent (TCSG: 11; Owen 2003: 61). With the break-up of 
the two giant public companies, Coats Viyella and Courtauld at the end of the 
1990s, the industry became divided between a small number of large firms and 
a big tail of very small firms (CAPITB 2001: 8). A particularly large tail of 
micro  firms  constitute  an informal  sector. Around  74 per  cent of  remaining 
clothing manufacturers are said to have a turnover of less than £ 250,000 per 
annum  (Warren  2003:  233).  In  2002,  5,820  firms  achieved  a  total  value  of 
production  of  £4.8  billion  and  employed  127,000  people  (BATC  estimates, 
based on the ONS Index of Production).  
 
Thus,  the  German  industry  appears  to  achieve  a  higher  turnover  with  a 
significantly lower number of employees, demonstrating a productivity deficit 
by the UK industry that is widely acknowledged (e.g. Euratex 1998, cited by 
Stengg 2001: figure 7, p. 16). (See also Dunford’s (2001) comparative figures 
on output and employment for 1999 (table 9a: 13).)  
 
Table 3.  Structure of the German and UK Clothing Industries, 2001/2 
 
  No. of firms  Turnover (€ billion)  No. of employees 
German industry 
(firms with >20 employees)*    560  9.65    53,901 
German industry 
(all firms)**    6,159  14.40  - 
UK industry 
(all firms)*    5,820  8.92    127,000 
 
Sources:  VR2003;  IHK  Bielefeld  data,  2002;  ONS  Annual  Business  Inquiry  2001  and  BATC 
estimates 
 
Note:    * Data for 2002; ** Data for 2001 
 
A more straightforward comparison of the two national industries is achieved 
when  looking  at  industry  rates  of  concentration.  As  shown  in  Table  4,  the 
German  industry  is  significantly  more  highly  concentrated  than  its  UK 
counterpart. A share of turnover by the top three companies of 32.9 per cent 
compares with one of 19 per cent for UK companies; the share of the German 
top five companies of 45.2 per cent, compares with 27.7 per cent for the UK top  
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five. Taking the top ten companies into consideration, the level of concentration 
of German companies comes close to double that of the UK top ten (Euratex 
2001: 36, figures for 1999, cited by Dunford 2001: 7). These data pre-date the 
break-up of Coats Viyella and Courtauld. 
 
Table 4. Share of Turnover of Companies in the UK and German Clothing Industries, in 1999 
 
Per cent  Top 3  Top 5  Top 10 
Germany  32.9  45.2  62.2 
UK  19.4  27.7  37.0 
 
Source: Euratex 2001 
 
The different size structures are accompanied by divergent ownership profiles. 
In  Germany,  total  or  substantial  family  ownership  is  widespread,  extending 
even to the large firms, such as Triumph, Escada, Betty Barclay and Steilmann. 
Family-run firms may also be listed companies, as is the case for Escada. In the 
UK, there still exist a few large companies listed on the stock exchange, e.g. 
Burberry (which spun out of GUS in 2002 and is classified as a retailer) and 
Wensum.  But  their number has shrunk markedly  in the 1990s as individual 
large investors or equity funds have taken them into private ownership (e.g. 
Sterling Group, and William Baird before it was split up) or managers have led 
buy-outs (e.g. Quantum and BMB). Inherited family firms are more rare than in 
Germany.  Nevertheless,  even  some  large  British  firms  remain  in  family 
ownership  (e.g.  Desmond),  sometimes  with  professional  management  to  run 
them (e.g. Dewhirst).  
 
Ownership of the many smaller clothing firms is less well documented but, 
according to industry insiders, ethnic minority owners in Britain are prominent 
in  the  industry  (constituting  around  35  per  cent  of  owners,  according  to 
CAPITB 2001: 5). They have given one section of this industry, concentrated in 
big  cities  like  Leicester  and  in  the  east  of  London,  its  special  character. 
Germany does not seem to have such a sector (P. Donath, IG Metall Executive, 
personal  communication,  7  January  2004),  although  an  artisanal  form  of 
production is said to exist (VR 2003).  
 
3.3.2  Managerial Capabilities and Skill Profiles 
 
There  exist  no  statistics  on  managerial  education  and  capabilities,  and  the 
following draws largely on interview material. One industry insider described 
British  managers  in  the  clothing  industry  to  us  as  ‘generally  of  very  low 
calibre’. Levels of education and specialist expertise, with a few exceptions, 
appear to be significantly lower than those of their German counterparts, and  
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some  of  those  currently  at  senior  levels  had  left  school  with  few  or  no 
qualifications  and  had  worked  their  way  up  in  the  industry.  Graduate 
recruitment is problematic for the UK clothing industry as a whole (PSS 2000); 
according to CAPITB Trust (2001: 19), of new employees recruited each year 
by the industry, around 0.23 per cent were graduates. German managers, in 
contrast, were mainly graduates with relevant tertiary education. Currently, one 
university and three colleges of technology (Fachhochschulen) offer courses in 
textile  and  clothing  engineering,  management,  marketing  and  technology 
(Technik) (BBI 2001/02: 34). In Britain, universities that used to have textiles 
departments seem to have merged them into fashion/design schools, and we did 
not encounter any of their graduates among our interviewees.  
 
British clothing firms are said to attach a relatively low importance to design 
because they are generally competing on price, rather than excellent design, and 
their large retail customers in any case usually employ their own design teams. 
Additionally, available designers are not rated well on technical and commercial 
understanding,  although  they  score  highly  on  creativity  (TCSG  2000:  12; 
Interview  Notes 2003).  One  industry  insider,  reflecting  on  the  popularity  of 
fashion design courses, noted that there were jobs available for at most 10 per 
cent of the 3,000 graduates of such programmes each year, whereas there was a 
severe  lack  of  young  people  with  solid  technical  design  skills  entering  the 
industry. 
 
More  information  is  available  about  general  skill  structures.  A  sector 
comparison by Steedman and Wagner (1989: 47-49) found that at higher levels 
of training, more than ten times as  many German as British employees had 
passed vocational examinations. According to CAPITB (2001: 16), technical 
specialists  constituted  a  mere  4  per  cent  of  all  British employees.  Our own 
impressions,  too,  were  that  there  seemed  to  be  more  and  more  technically 
qualified designers and technical staff in German than British firms. At British 
NVQ level 3, which is equivalent to an A-level, there were only 44 passes in 
2001/02 (City and Guilds of London Institute and Skillfast UK, 2003).  
 
Further  down the  hierarchy,  among  British  supervisory  staff  and  operatives, 
levels of qualification are low to non-existent, and training budgets constrained. 
Thus, only 20 per cent of operatives have NVQ level 1 and 2 qualifications 
(TCSG 2000: 27). In 2001/02, only 977 NVQ certificates were awarded at this 
level, while in clothing supervisory studies there were none at all (Owen 2003: 
60). These qualification levels are consonant with the use of a casual labour 
force that has low wages and no employment security (Warren 2003: 232). This 
is a view supported by some of our own observations, with some firms claiming 
to  be  too  pressed  financially  to  afford  training.  Awareness  of  government- 
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sponsored  initiatives,  for  example  Modern  Apprenticeships  and  National 
Traineeships, is less than complete (PSS, 2000). The German training effort is 
in a different league. In 2001, the ratio of trainees to total employees was 7.5 
per cent, and the total number of trainees in 2000 was 2,726, of which most 
were fashion sewers and fashion tailors (BBI 2001/02).  
 
These  divergent  skill  structures  are  also  reflected  in  payment  structures.  In 
Britain, wage levels in this industry are among the lowest and were even lower 
before the arrival of the minimum wage in 1999. The industry in some areas has 
relied  strongly  on  ethnic  minority  employees,  many  of  them  home  workers 
(Taplin  1994:  211-12;  Felstead  and  Jewson  2000;  Heyes  and  Gray  2001; 
Warren 2003). In Germany, the much more union-controlled industry had to 
pay  wages  which,  although  below  the  level  in  many  other  industries,  were 
nevertheless comparatively high. These differences in wage levels are shown 
above, in Figure 1.  
 
In Germany, the hourly wage rate for manual workers in 2001 was Euros 12.41, 
and general labour costs per hour came to 26.1 Euros – the highest costs in the 
developed world (BBI 2001/02: 11, 25). (Here it is instructive to note that the 
salary costs of remaining German employees are almost as high as the wage 
costs  paid  to  suppliers  who,  typically,  have  much  larger  work  forces  (VR 
2003:2, table 2).) In Britain, hourly wages of male full-time workers in 2002 
were £ 7.33, but only £ 5.95 for women (ONS Labour Market Trends). At these 
rates  of  pay,  experienced  female  workers  are  choosing  instead  to  work  in 
supermarkets. A publication by  UK Garments Workers (2000) comments as 
follows:  
 
“Some  employers  in  the  industry  run  what  can  only  be  called 
sweatshops. They break many of the UK laws on the minimum wage, 
health and safety and employment protection”.  
 
Savings are still being attempted by employing home workers who, although 
now more often paid the minimum wage, reduce employers’ costs in terms of 
lighting, heating and maintaining production facilities (KFAT 2000). 
 
To  sum  up  this  section,  in  both  countries  a  significant  share  of  the  jobs 
remaining in the home country are higher level, human capital intensive jobs in 
management,  finance,  marketing,  technical  work  and  design.  But  this 
development is much more marked in the German than in the UK industry. 
Thus, whereas in the UK clothing industry, according to CAPITB Trust (2001: 
16), white-collar staff in the managerial, technical and supervisory categories 
amounted  to  20  per  cent  of  all  employees,  in  German  clothing  firms  
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white-collar workers amount to a massive 45 per cent. The remaining 55 per 
cent of employees are mainly in logistics and in finishing processes (P. Donath, 
IG Metall Executive, personal communication, 7 January 2004).  
 
3.3.3  Production and Market Strategy 
 
The  above  skill  structures  crucially  determine  both  production  and  market 
strategy. According to Steedman and Wagner (1989: 41), whose work pre-dates 
the  full-scale  shift  of  manufacturing  work  overseas,  the  German  industry 
engages in production of small batches of high-quality goods in great variety 
(production run of 150-300 garments) whereas British firms depend to a great 
extent on long runs of standard items – in the majority of plants they visited, 
15,000  garments.  They  pinpoint  differences  in  technical  design  (greater 
complexity in Germany), as well as in fabrics and trim used (higher quality in 
Germany). This picture is confirmed in more qualitative terms by more recent 
sources.  Thus,  Groemling  and  Matthes  (2003:  69)  emphasise  that  the 
competitive advantage of German producers in international business rests on 
specialisation in niche products. They cater mainly for the upper middle market, 
with an emphasis on quality and, in most cases, brand, and have an orientation 
to specific customer groups. BBI (2001/02: 11) speaks about the existence of 
between  20  and  30  globally  traded  brands  in  the  German  industry.  Our 
interview results support this strong emphasis on brand. All three sets of authors 
point out that this production paradigm depends on the presence of high skill 
levels  at  the  upper  end  of  value  chain  and  on  a  high  level  of  control  over 
suppliers.  
 
In  the  UK,  a  very  small  number  of  firms  concentrate  on  brands  with  high 
margins (e.g. Paul Smith and Burberry, as well as some producers of men’s 
woollen  suits  and  some  knitwear  producers).  They  are  counterposed  to  a 
majority that make fairly standard clothes in the middle to low market segment. 
Few of these have been able to foster a brand. Abandonment of a branding 
capability has occurred in favour of achieving the apparently greater security, 
but  lower  margins,  of  contract  clothing  production  sold  under  the  retailer’s 
label.  Large  firms  that  had  owned  both  branded  and  contract  clothing 
businesses, such as Coats Viyella and William Baird, seemed unable to manage 
the different investment and marketing strategies required. Compared to their 
main competitors, British firms have a lower level of capital investment (TCSG 
2000: 7), and tend to be reluctant to make the up-front marketing investments 
required to build a branded presence. 
 
The TCSG (2000: 9) finds that ‘because a large part of the industry has relied 
on supplying goods for High Street retailers’ own labels, many UK textile and  
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clothing manufacturers have not developed high levels of marketing expertise’ 
and  thus  have  not  developed  brands  for  exports.  The  close  relationship  to 
powerful  domestic  retailers  relieves  these  firms  of  problems  of  design  and 
marketing, “but at the cost of leaving them invisible to the consumer and with a 
limited capacity to innovate” (Owen 2003: 56).  
 
Given these divergent production paradigms and products, clothing enterprises 
in the two economies also differ in their export performance. German firms 
achieve the relatively high export ratio of 32 per cent (VR 2003). As, due to 
cultural changes in buying of clothes, they have encountered greater difficulties 
in  their  home  markets  in  recent  years,  firms  have  increased  their  exporting 
efforts and since 1995 have achieved a growth rate of 6 per cent per annum. In 
international comparative terms, this export growth rate exceeds that of the UK, 
the US and even that of Italy (Groemling and Matthes 2003: 77). An analysis by 
Euratex  (2002:  86)  suggests  that  Germany’s  share  of  EU  sales  directed  to 
non-EU countries rose from 12.4 per cent in 1996 to 19.1 per cent in 2000, 
making it one of the EU’s most successful exporters. Destinations are mainly 
other western European countries, but exports to CEE and particularly to Russia 
(VR 2003) have also seen a steep increase from a low base.  
 
British exports of apparel are unreliably documented (ONS figures mix genuine 
exports of  finished  items  of clothing  with exports of  clothing parts  sent for 
making up by factories in lower wage countries), but most qualitative accounts 
speak of a very low export ratio (Warren 2003: 231). Indeed, Euratex (2002: 
105-6)  notes  that  UK  trade  with  non-EU  countries  remains  below  the  EU 
average, while the share of sales directed to other EU countries, at 25.7 per cent, 
was  approximately  10  percentage  points  below  the  EU  average.  This  is 
consistent  with  the  orientation  of  most  large  firms  to  focus  on  domestic 
retailers. The majority of large firms we interviewed did no exporting at all and 
were not aiming to achieve any. Exceptions are brands such as Paul Smith and 
Burberry,  and  firms  making  medium-  to  highly-priced  men’s  suits,  such  as 
BMB and Berwin and Berwin.  
 
Thus, in both national industries we find that, apart from sourcing activity, firms 
hardly  correspond to  our  image  of global  firms,  either in  terms  of  size and 
turnover or in their degree of activity abroad. The larger German firms may be 
characterised as international or European players, both in terms of their size 
and in their sales activity, but most British firms seem to be entirely confined to 
the  national  market.  Thus,  in  both  countries,  few  firms  are  multinational 
companies. In both countries, a few have one or two foreign subsidiaries doing 
manufacturing,  and  some  German  firms  have  sales  offices  mainly  in  the 
European countries that are their main markets.   
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The clothing industry also is closely connected to steps in the value chain of 
other industries. As fabrics are both the basic raw material for and the most 
costly input into clothing manufacture (VR 2003: 2), the textiles industry is one 
of the main upstream suppliers to clothing manufacturers. The quality, design 
and innovativeness of fabrics have a strong bearing on whether clothing may be 
sold in the middle and upper market segments and on whether a manufacturer 
can occupy a market niche that is partially sheltered from competition (Wrona 
1999: 153). The German textiles industry, although under pressure, is still of 
significantly larger size than its UK counterpart, as well as containing more and 
larger producers of technical textiles for clothing use. A close relationship with 
textile machinery manufacturers also is of importance, in that innovations in 
machinery often translate into innovative stitching, etc. (Interview Notes 2004). 
Again, the survival of such machinery producers in Germany, but not in the UK, 
makes quick diffusion of such innovation into the German clothing industry 
more likely.   
 
This overview of the two national clothing industries makes it clear that they 
contain  very  different  populations  of  firms.  In  terms  of  the  firm  types 
introduced in section 2.1, type 1 predominates in the German industry, whereas 
type 2 and (in the informal sector) type 3 are most frequently found in the UK. 
Type 5, as the next section reveals, is growing in both countries. The gradual 
emergence of type 4 in Germany will be discussed in section 4.2. 
 
3.4  The Retail Sector 
 
In Germany, the retail sector for clothing has a polarized structure. On the one 
side, there still exist the small independents with one or a few retail outlets 
(about 60,000, or 38 per cent at the turn of the century) (BBI 2001/02: 3; Baden 
and Velia 2002: 58). On the other side, there are giant department store chains 
like Karstadt and Kaufhof, as well as very large mail order firms. The top four 
clothing  retailers  occupy  one-quarter  of  the  market  (Jean  Pascale,  Annual 
Report  2002)  –  see  Table  5,  below.  In  recent  years,  large  retailers  have 
embarked much more on creating their own brands (Wrona 1999: 158), and 
they increasingly buy directly from overseas suppliers (ibid: 152; Baden and 
Velia 2002: 103; VR 2003). Two further important actors in clothing retail are 
supermarkets and food discounters. The latter are said to have grown from 1.7 
per cent to 12 per cent of the market during the last 20 years (Wrona 1999). 
Last, new foreign verticals like Zara, Promod and Mango have contributed to 
intensified competition in the retail market.  
 
Although German independents have been shrinking heavily during recent years 
they remain much more important than they are in Britain. Product quality ranks  
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highly among considerations for German consumers (Wrona 1999: 156), and 
this partly sustains the independents that deal in the ‘high quality’ segment of 
the market. Collective buying through purchasing associations may be another 
contributory factor to the longer survival of the independents, who can thus 
partially overcome their individual weakness as buyers. In between these and 
the giants are the medium-sized, often regional, chains of department stores, as 
well as a number of newer, specialised clothing retailers. No retailer approaches 
the size and influence of Marks & Spencer in the UK, but concentration in the 
retail sector is nevertheless growing.  
 
Clothing retailers in Germany have experienced a fall in demand for clothing, as 
well as pressure on their margins. (Despite rising incomes, the proportion spent 
on clothes has declined drastically over time, from 6.4 per cent in 1990 to 4.9 
per cent in 1998 (Groemling and Matthes 2003: 23)). Prices in this sector have 
risen more slowly than inflation, and competition between retailers has become 
intense.  Thus,  the  power  resources  of  retailers  vis-à-vis  manufacturers  have 
been growing, and German clothing manufacturers are confronted with raised 
demands with respect to service, delivery time, frequency of collections, etc. 
(Wrona 1999: 158). But this development is fairly recent and has come much 
later than in Britain.  
 
Despite the above, concentration in the retail sector is relatively low compared 
with Britain, and German clothing firms still possess a greater variety of sales 
outlets for their products than British ones, both domestically and in foreign 
markets. Several large German clothing firms claim to refuse to deal with the 
giant  department  store  chains  because  they  are  not  willing  to  tolerate  the 
steadily worsening terms of supply; instead they are actively seeking to open 
their own retail outlets (Interview Notes 2003).  
 
Table 5.  Share of turnover of top four clothing retailing groups/companies 
 
Germany  Karstadt-Quelle; Otto; C&A; Metro  25% 
UK  Marks & Spencer; Arcadia Group; Storehouse; Next  40% 
 
Sources:  War on Want 2001: 8; Jean Pascale Annual Report 2002 
 
In Britain, as Table 5 shows, concentration in the retail sector is significantly 
more advanced than in Germany. Specialist clothing retailers, such as Marks & 
Spencer,  Arcadia  (Top  Shop,  Dorothy  Perkins,  Evans,  Miss  Selfridge),  the 
former  Storehouse  (Bhs  and  Mothercare)  and  the  Next  Group  dominated  in 
2000 with a 40 per cent of the market for clothing (War on Want 2001: 8), of 
which Marks & Spencer held the lion’s share. According to Retail Intelligence 
(2000a: 4, quoted by Baden and Velia: 62), the index of concentration in British  
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retail is 75 per cent – the highest in Europe. The power of Marks & Spencer 
over manufacturers is legendary. Baden and Velia (2002: 60) say that, of the 
remaining jobs in the UK clothing industry, 80,000 are dependent on M&S. 
Also of importance is the highly concentrated supermarket sector, where Tesco 
and Asda offer very competitive, own-label clothing created for them by known 
designers, and now occupy a significant share of the clothing market. Thus, 
sales of Tesco’s own labels have been growing at six times the market rate, and 
Asda’s George label has made the supermarket the fifth largest clothing retailer 
in the UK (The Guardian, 16 January 2004: 3). This concentration of clothing 
retailing among large multiples has virtually eliminated independent retailers.  
 
The  resulting  high  degree  of  competition  in  the  clothing  retail  market  has 
depressed prices and margins (Baden and Velia 2002; Retail Intelligence 2000, 
cited by War on Want 2001: 8). The largest retailers have been seeking to pass 
on the costs of this reduction in margins to their suppliers. The second largest 
retailer,  the  Arcadia  Group,  gained  infamy  in  2002  through  its  one-sided 
imposition  of  price  cuts  on  clothing  firms.  Direct  buying  by  retailers  has 
increased (Interview Notes 2003). Next and Littlewoods, for example, maintain 
overseas buying offices (Robins and Humphrey 2000: 13-14), and Marks & 
Spencer is also experimenting with buying directly from producers overseas 
(Interview Notes 2003). 
 
The big British retailers are said to have a sales volume that is about eight times 
greater than that of even the biggest clothing firms (Warren 2003: 233). This 
high  level  of  buyer  concentration,  contrasted  with  a  low  level  of  seller 
concentration,  indicates  a  huge  imbalance  of  power  and  a  consequent  large 
negative  impact  on  sellers’  margins  (ibid:  233).  This  imbalance  is  further 
accentuated by the fact that  most sellers lack high-end, fashionable branded 
products with which to seek alternative markets. 
 
For  most  British  clothing  producers  the  choice  of  retail  customers  thus  is 
severely restricted, as most do not engage in exporting. Hence, they are tied to 
the small number of highly concentrated retailers that dominate the domestic 
market,  plus  a  few  independent  department stores.  In  this  situation  clothing 
firms do not have a significant level of control, either over the size of their 
market  and  the  conditions  of  sale,  or  over  the  durability  of  the  customer 
relationship. Where firms have tied their fortunes to only one or a handful of 
large domestic multiples, the size of their market will fluctuate with the market 
share of those retailers. Moreover they will also be vulnerable to their ability to 
satisfy  the  retailers  at  least  as  well  as  competing  suppliers.  Because 
relationships with high street retailers are not contractual, in the sense that there 
are never guarantees of how much product a retailer will procure in any one  
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season (let alone year), these clothing firms remain highly vulnerable to a fall 
from favour. When Marks & Spencer consolidated its supplier base in 1999, it 
discontinued at three months’ notice a longstanding relationship with Baird – 
which at the time was one of its largest suppliers in some categories of clothing. 
Baird lost a legal battle for compensation and was commercially ruined. 
 
Thus, to sum up, in both Germany and the UK there is a concentrated and 
powerful  retail  sector,  but  the  degree  of  concentration  is  significantly  more 
advanced in the UK than in Germany. Furthermore, German clothing firms, 
being larger and more skill-intensive as well as often being specialised brand 
producers, have more power resources of their own. Their large and growing 
export  activity  is  the  final  factor,  which  prevents  the  total  dependence  on 
domestic retailers we found in a large number of cases in the UK. To date, this 
has prevented  the  emergence  of  buyer  dominance,  as  underlined  by  Gereffi 
(1994) for the US. Thus, although German retailer-buyers are important in the 
triangle  of  power,  they  are  not  consistently  dominant  because  of  the 
countervailing power of clothing producers. 
 
Nevertheless, in both countries, albeit to differing degrees, clothing firms are 
under intense pressure from two sources. On the one side, there is growing 
competition  from  low-wage  countries,  where  some  firms  have  engaged  in 
technological upgrading and are not far from becoming hub firms in their own 
right.  Many  are  already  trading  directly  with  retailers,  cutting  out  the 
co-ordinating clothing firm ‘middlemen’ in developed countries. The phasing 
out of the ATC in 2005 is likely to further intensify such pressures. On the other 
side, there are powerful retailers who exert growing pressure on two fronts: 
first,  via  increasing  pressure  on  margins,  while  simultaneously  raising 
requirements  in  terms  of  frequency  of  model  and  fashion  changes. 
Ever-shortening fashion cycles confront clothing firms with tightening delivery 
schedules. Second, retailers are establishing direct relations with suppliers in 
low-wage  countries.  This  will  be  much  easier  for  UK  retailers  who  handle 
predominantly  low-  to  middle-market  clothes  where  mediation  by  British 
co-ordinating firms is not essential. The next section examines how clothing 




4.  Company Strategies in Response to Growing Pressures  
 
Two main strategies have been adopted in response both to competition from 
low wage countries and to pressures from retailers:  
 
1.  relocation of steps in the value chain to low-wage countries 
2.  a strategic reorientation concerning products and market access 
 
In each case, companies’ adaptation may be either passive, i.e. centred on a 
simple adaptation of the goods and services a firm offers to changes in demand, 
or active, i.e. launching products with new features and actively differentiating 
products  to  secure  niche  markets  (Dunford  2001:  5).  Adaptation  is  not 
exhausted  by  initiatives  in  the  product  area,  but  may  additionally  involve 
organisational strategies to reach new markets.  
 
4.1  Outsourcing: Production in Low-wage Countries  
 
The  most  important  adaptation  to  competitive  pressures  from  low-wage 
countries, as already indicated, has been the relocation of the manufacturing 
function to such countries in Asia-Pacific, North Africa and East and Central 
Europe. The clothing industry is a highly labour-intensive industry in which 
wages for relatively lowly skilled workers account for a significant share of the 
production costs, and, with a low scope for automation, is likely to remain so. 
Nevertheless, as section 3.1 indicates, quota costs and tariff rates have as least 
as much impact on decisions on outsourcing locations as do wage rates. This 
section explores sourcing general strategies, as well as recent changes in them.  
 
Four different possibilities are open to hub firms when considering the location 
of their production: 
 
1.  Retaining the production function in fully or partially owned production 
facilities, through FDI in lower-wage countries. 
2.  Manufacturing to order by third-party contractors, which usually takes the 
form  of  outward  processing.
3  Contractors  may  or  may  not  be  “full 
package” suppliers. 
3.  Direct  importing  (“buying  in”)  from  lower-wage  countries,  sometimes 
through an agent. Bought-in goods are often items necessary to complete 
(or complement) a collection that cannot be designed in-house due to lack 
of capacity or lack of expertise.  
4.  Retaining  the  production  in  the  home  country,  either  in  self-owned 
production facilities or by engaging in local outsourcing.  
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Combined strategies are, of course, adopted in many cases.  
 
Before examining the types of strategy adopted by German and UK firms, it is 
necessary to emphasise the very different timing they have adopted, pointing 
once again to an active adaptation by German firms and a passive one by UK 
firms. Thus, early outsourcing in Germany from the 1970s onwards (Froebel, 
Heinrichs and Kreye 1980) may be contrasted with a very late start in the UK, 
from the mid-1990s onwards (BATC 2003). 
 
For German firms, relocation of the production function in the form of outward 
processing is by far the most prevalent strategy, and one that has gained in 
importance since the end of the 1980s. In distant second place come both direct 
importing  and  full  package  manufacturing;  and  third,  manufacturing  in 
lower-wage countries through direct investment in their own factories (Adler 
2002,  quoted  by  G&M  2003:  80).  Concerning  the  fourth  option,  our 
interviewing showed that it was highly exceptional among the larger firms to 
retain  their  own  manufacturing  in  Germany,  except  as  a  minor  facility  for 
making samples. Domestic sourcing for short runs and re-orders in Germany 
also is said to be infrequent and instead occurs in neighbouring CEE countries 
(P. Donath, IG Metall Executive, personal communication, 7 January 2004). 
 
Only impressionistic evaluations of British firms’ arrangements are available, 
supported by estimations based on our interviews. In Britain, too, outsourcing to 
independent third-party suppliers is by far the dominant strategy and appears to 
be increasingly of the ‘full package’ variety. However, where clothing firms are 
supplying to a dominant retailer, the latter now more frequently specifies the 
fabric  source,  thereby  depriving  clothing  firms  of  another  area  of  expertise 
(Baden and Velia 2002). The clothing firms themselves increasingly expect ‘full 
package’ supply by  their third-party contractors, and some will not consider 
dealing with a supplier unless it is financially strong enough to bear the cost of 
fabric  purchase  (Interview  Notes  2003).  Some  firms  retain  ownership  of 
production facilities in low-wage countries, both in CEE and in Asia although, 
as in Germany, this is a less favoured strategy. Every firm we spoke to uses 
third party suppliers for some part of its product range, even if only for top-up 
flexibility. Continuation of domestic manufacturing in self-owned plants is now 
very rare for the bigger firms, with numerous plant closures having taken place 
in the last three or four years (Interview Notes 2003).  
 
What  remains  more  widespread  in  the  UK  than  in  Germany,  however,  is 
outsourcing both by retailers and by co-ordinating firms to domestic suppliers 
for replenishment and experimental short runs. This work is still being carried 
out by smaller firms, which themselves often have several tiers of their own  
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suppliers and use home work (Warren 2003). Outsourcing to lower tiers is done 
informally,  probably  without  the  explicit  knowledge  of  the  firm  placing  the 
order. Payment at or even below the minimum wage, plus few social payments, 
sustain  this  practice,  which  explains  the  large  and  continually  shifting 
population of micro firms in a largely informal sector (KFAT 2001; Warren 
2003).  
 
The practice of extensively using local suppliers (within lower-wage Europe 
and North Africa) for replenishment and some high fashion clothing should be 
seen as  a complement to the  high proportion  of foreign suppliers  in  distant 
Asian countries where wage rates in several are below those in CEE (see Figure 
3). (Note that these hourly rates date back to just after the Asian currency crisis, 
which will affect dollar values of some Asian wage rates, but the general order 
of magnitude probably remains valid.
4) 
 

















Source:  Based on material in Werner International Inc., Hourly Labor Cost in the Apparel Industry 
 
 
Tables 6a and 6b show in more detail the geographical location of the suppliers 









































































Table 6.  Sourcing Locations 
 
a)  Top ten suppliers of outerwear to Germany in 2001 (in millions of Euros) 
 
Turkey    2,378 
China    1,359 
Italy    1,350 
Netherlands    836 
Bangladesh    747 
Poland    646 
Hong Kong    634 
Romania    510 
India    417 
Greece    403 
Source:  Eurostat, cited in Sippo 2002. 
 
b)  Top ten suppliers of apparel to Britain in 2001 (in millions of Pounds) 
 
Hong Kong    1,584 
Turkey    756 
China    657 
Italy    473 
Bangladesh    350 
India    349 
Belgium/Luxembourg    332 
Germany    321 
Romania    285 
Morocco    109 
Source:  HM Customs and Excise, supplied by BATC. 
 
 
The data in these tables, although not strictly comparable, nevertheless indicate 
that there is significant overlap of sources for finished garments. What is less 
apparent from these tables is the great extent to which Germany uses suppliers 
from CEE countries for outward processing work. The countries (and therefore 
wage structures) where they are closely involved with supplier firms overlap 
relatively  little  with  the  geographical  locations  favoured  by  UK  firms 
(predominantly Asian countries and Turkey).  
 
For German firms, four fifths of outward processed clothes came from central 
and  east  European  states,  plus  Turkey  (Groemling  and  Matthes  2003:  80). 
Poland and Romania were by far the two most important sources. According to 
BBI (2002/03: 24), in 2001 only eight countries among the 23 largest German 
suppliers  were  not  from  CEE;  namely  Tunisia,  Turkey,  Morocco,  Portugal, 
Greece, Vietnam, Malaysia and China. Turkey and China are said to be the most 
favoured  countries  for  ‘full  package’  production  to  order,  working  with  
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prescribed patterns and quality standards (VR 2003: 4). This could be because 
of the local availability of fabrics that the factories can source themselves, again 
to the specification of the company placing the clothing order; it was certainly 
the pattern that emerged among British companies interviewed. 
 
Again,  information  about  UK  firms’  sourcing  strategies  is  more  anecdotal. 
Industry  observers,  and  firms  themselves,  mention  historical  reasons  for  the 
high proportion of activity with China and the Indian subcontinent: for example, 
exporters  and  agents  based  in  Hong  Kong  invested  in  China  (and  later 
elsewhere in Asia), and those in India invested in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, 
once quota in their home countries had become difficult. Ethnic links between 
the UK and supplier countries also play a role. More than one British clothing 
firm mentioned that Turkish-owned suppliers, to whose British factories they 
had outsourced production for years, had invested in Turkey during the 1990s 
and now filled the orders in Turkey rather than in the UK. Specific historical or 
political  reasons  for  sourcing  from  Morocco  are  unclear,  other  than  that 
Morocco has a tariff-free trade agreement with the EU (as does Turkey). 
 
The  popularity  of  the  foreign  sourcing  option  for  clothing  firms  in  both 
countries, as against production in their own foreign subsidiaries, receives the 
following  explanation  from  managers.  It  offers  a  high  degree  of  flexibility; 
sufficient, even if not complete, control; and a low tie-up of capital. Flexibility 
here usually refers to the possibility of moving on from one supplier to another. 
This  occurs  either  for  reasons  of  efficiency  or,  more  often  in  recent  years, 
because new, even lower-wage countries offer viable facilities. Although such 
footloose behaviour is not rampant, it is nevertheless a strategy that firms in 
both countries adhered to – even firms whose managers strongly subscribe to 
the  notion  of  close  and  long-term  relations  with  suppliers  (Interview  Notes 
2003). 
 
Thus, German firms started out in the 1970s with southern European firms, such 
as Greece, Portugal and the former Yugoslavia, as well as Turkey and some 
Asian firms (Groemling and Matthes 2003: 80). Currently, due to price rises in 
CEE countries in view of imminent accession to the EU, there is a strong trend 
to  move  further  east  to  Romania,  and  a  weaker  trend  towards  Bulgaria, 
Lithuania and Ukraine. Among Asian countries China is the most popular, with 
about 4.1 per cent of clothing imports having come from Chinese firms during 
the decade between 1990-2000 (Groemling and Matthes 2003: 49, figure 13b). 
British firms are also moving eastward in Central and Eastern Europe and have 
become  more focused on China, but Turkey  and Morocco have also gained 
greatly in popularity (BATC 2003).  
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To what degree and how do German and UK hub firms exert control over their 
nominally independent suppliers? Although coordination of the relationship by 
German  firms  occurs  through  contractual  agreements,  production  in  reality 
remains under the influence of the German principal. The degree of vertical 
integration  is  only  minimally  affected  (Wrona  1999:  161).  The  presence  of 
strategies to retain control, such as having their own technical staff with the 
supplier, was also confirmed by our interviews. The British firms had more 
mixed methods to exert control, ranging from the use of agents to employing 
roving inspectors who conduct quality controls. Since British firms have less 
geographical proximity with their suppliers, and have fewer trained technical 
staff  available  to  them  compared  with  German  clothing  firms,  one  may 
conjecture that control is less fully maintained than in the German case. 
 
4.2  Adaptation in Product and Market Strategy 
 
Active adaptation of product and market strategy was mainly evident in German 
firms, whereas British firms were again mainly passive adapters. For German 
firms, the following strategies are reported in the literature and supported by our 
interviews:  
 
1.  Utilisation  of  market  niches,  by  developing  whole  collections  with 
matching clothing and accessories, or by responding to new demand for 
multi-functional  casual  clothing  and  the  more  eclectic  combination  by 
consumers  of  low-cost  items  with  high-cost  garments  (Groemling  and 
Matthes 2003). 
2.  A  stronger  development  towards  customer  orientation,  including  quick 
response  delivery  and  increasing  fashion  content  by  adopting  a  greatly 
increased number of (and partially overlapping) fashion cycles per year.  
3.  An attempt to gain fuller control over the final stage of the value chain, i.e. 
by selling directly to final consumers. Measures to this end included efforts 
at verticalisation by opening self-owned retail outlets, and by building up 
‘shops within shops’ devoted to putting across a complete fashion concept. 
4.  Strengthening presence in exports markets and vis-à-vis foreign consumers 
by setting up new retail outlets abroad. Thus, retail-related FDI has jumped 
phenomenally since 1995 (Matthes 2002; Groemling and Matthes 2003: 
78), mainly in developed countries in Europe and North America, which 
suggests it has occurred principally to support exports. By having offices 
and shops in the importing country, better customer contact is maintained 
(ibid). Interviews confirmed this trend.  
 
Above all, efforts to strengthen brand, both at home and abroad were paramount 
(see Groemling and Matthes 2003, for a more extended description).  
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British co-ordinating firms also forged closer customer relations but, with a few 
notable exceptions, they were not pro-active in the other measures described 
above. They mainly strove to do better what they had always done, which was 
to match the increasing demands of the retailers they served.  
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The  paper  has  advanced  three  main  theoretical  claims  and  has  striven  to 
substantiate them in the light of data on the organisation of the German and UK 
clothing industries.  
 
First, it has been suggested that clothing firms need to be viewed in the network 
of all their relationships, considering both the geography of production and the 
geography of trade. Such a dual focus makes clear that firms in the clothing 
industry are simultaneously strongly localised and very internationalised, if not 
globalised. 
 
German firms are more internationalised than UK firms. They have relocated 
production for a much longer period, albeit mainly to lower-wage south and east 
European  economies,  and  they  are  strong  exporters,  mainly  to  European 
destinations. They have recently invested in sales offices and retail outlets in 
their  main  foreign  markets.  Hence  German  firms  cannot  be  described  as 
globalised  –  they  are  at  most  internationalised  or  even  Europeanised.  Most 
British companies, in contrast, have been held captive in their national economy 
by big retailers for many decades. Their extreme dependence on the latter, and 
their  failure  to  develop  their  own  recognised  brands,  has  shaped  both  their 
sourcing  and  their  exporting  activity.  Foreign  sourcing  came  late,  but 
production networks are now more far-flung than those of German firms. The 
focus on their main retail customers has hampered the development of export 
activity,  intensifying  even  more  their  dependence  and  their  mainly  national 
orientation.  
 
Very few firms in either country are large multinationals, and the structure of 
both industries suggests nationally specific firm profiles: in the German case, 
mainly Mittelstand firms; and in the UK, a small number of large firms together 
with a large tail of very small and under-capitalised enterprises. Thus, we urge 
some caution in presenting the clothing industry as a highly globalised industry. 
Instead, we point to an incongruous mixture of national embeddedness and, in 
the  UK  case,  dependence,  combined  with  some  insertion  into 
international/global production networks. 
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Second, we have argued that consideration of the relationships of co-ordinating 
firms with both their suppliers and their retail customers influences how one 
sees  the  triangle  of  power  between  these  hub  firms,  the  suppliers  and  the 
retailers. Gereffi’s (1994) notion of commodity chains dominated by retailers is 
not universally applicable; rather, it is peculiar to Anglo-American capitalism.  
 
The pattern of German firms’ structure and strategy has shown that principal 
firms  can  develop  their  own  power  resources.  This  saves  them  from  total 
dependence on large multiple retailers and enables them to balance sales abroad 
with sales to domestic customers. This decisive difference between German and 
UK clothing firms rests on a different skill structure and the utilisation of that 
structure  to  become  actively  adaptive  to  global  pressures,  rather  than  just 
responding passively, as do most large British firms in this industry. 
 
Third, we have suggested that the hitherto dominant pattern of co-ordinating 
firms in developed countries and dependent suppliers in developing countries is 
showing some signs of change. Producers in low-wage countries are moving up 
the learning curve, and the best are preparing to become active competitors to 
clothing firms in developed economies. Such competition can take two forms: 
retailers  in  developed  countries  can  deal  directly  with  manufacturers  in 
low-wage  countries;  and  the  best  firms  in  the  more  advanced  newly 
industrialised countries have now become direct competitors in the markets of 
the  advanced  countries.  Wrona  (1999)  points  out  that  specific  suppliers  in 
low-wage countries have made large investments in plant and machinery, and 
now  stand  on  the  threshold  of  acquiring  the  capability  of  developing  and 
marketing their own collections. The first trend, as this paper has shown, is 
already well under way. The second trend is only emergent as it demands the 
development of high levels of skill both in the upstream functions of the value 
chain and in knowledge of western markets. But the knowledge and skills of the 
clothing industry are neither highly complex nor esoteric, and the absence of 
clear intellectual property rights makes copying relatively easy. Gereffi (1999) 
points out that firms in some developing countries have developed from ‘full 
package’  suppliers  to  ‘own  brand’  manufacturers,  thus  becoming  direct 
competitors  in  the  markets  of  developed  countries.  Some  firms  from  Hong 
Kong, such as Episode, Baleno, Bossini, Giordano, Jean West and Moiselle, 
have already acquired this higher level of expertise and have retail networks in 
major  cities  around  the  world  (Gereffi  1999:  56;  German  Chamber  of 
Commerce  2002/03:  15).  It  will  only  be  a  matter  of  time  before  firms  in 
currently less developed economies will follow suit. The decline of the clothing 
industry in developed economies therefore will continue. This decline will be 





1   ‘Full package’ supply means doing work that extends “from acquisition 
of the fabric to final trimming of the finished garments” (Scott 2002: 
1292). 
 
2   This discussion ignores the high-end knitwear sector, where the capital 
intensity of the machinery utilised can be high and the labour intensity 
low. 
 
3   Definition of outward processing: Goods are exported from one customs 
area into another, where further work is done on them, before they are 
sent back to the country of origin. Customs duty is payable on the value 
added in the foreign country and not on the total value of the goods. 
Although this rationale for outward processing has largely disappeared, 
the processes remain. 
 
4   Baden and Velia (2002: 68) note that retailer buyers are knowledgeable 
about wage costs in different countries, but that it is not clear where their 
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